Strategy: Opinion Poll Number 1.

[Bob_Huntley]

I have played Riviera's 10th well over a hundred or more times. In its curent configuration it is an absolute gem, but it is the size of the green that makes it so. Twice its size (it would still be small) and I wonder if we would be issuing panegyrics to its strategic merits?

[THuckaby2]

Bob - I'd say double the size of the green and EVERYTHING changes... the angle in ceases to matter much at all... it then just becomes simply a go for it or not decision, and that's OK, but doesn't invite panegyrics.

Yep, the tiny green and angle of it is what makes the golf hole so great - everything else plays off of that.

[DMoriarty]

Bob, doesnt the green slope slightly away from the golfer playing from the wrong angle, as well?   Some of this might have been neutralized by the wet conditions.  

I've always thought that tour pros play very conservatively, just due to the nature of competition and what's at stake on tour - this will be a good test of that thought.  I'll be very surprised if the percentage is more than 10... in a field where probably 75% or more have the length to reach the front left of the green.

For the week 31.4% went for the green (139/442).  
4.3% actually ended up on the green.  (6/139)
On Thursday 41% (32/78) went for the green.  

[THuckaby2]

David - thanks!

Wow, that's more than I thought would go for the green.  Still a pretty small percentage given how far they hit the ball, but more than I thought without a doubt.

TH

[DMoriarty]

Still a pretty small percentage given how far they hit the ball, but more than I thought without a doubt.

What would you consider a large percentage on a hole requiring a 300 yd carry to a green guarded by severe bunkers on three sides and with a tiny angled opening on one side?  60%?  80%?

[THuckaby2]

David:

I've thought about this some more, and finally found a schematic of #10, and well... it's not a 300 yard carry unless there is absolutely no roll... but given conditions this past week, that must have been the case!

So the percentages are very high, and really do surprise me.  I guess these guys don't play nearly as conservatively as I thought.  That is a pretty damn high percentage of players going for the green.

TH

[A_Clay_Man]

I still consider the spread of 2 - 8 to be wide for these guys, on this hole. Especially with 31.4% of them trying to go for the green off the tee. I wonder if the one 'other' occurred from a guy who went for it? But even the doubles are harsh, considering the player was probably within 20 yds of the hole laying one.

[TEPaul]

It's true that the green on Riviera's #10 basically makes the hole although the fairway width and mid-body bunkering arrangement of the hole is fascinating to create tee shot decision making that is meaningful on the tee shot alone. But the green has three extraordinary features about it that truly make the hole. The green is incredibly narrow particularly in the back (I spent about an hour on that hole measuring it and I don't think the rear is more than about 9 steps wide). But the thing that rearlly makes the green tricky is how it cants right to left and also how the green's length basically orients even to the left of the left side of the fairway!

Davis Love's tee shot at the green in 1998 basically tells it all. He drove at it, came up about 7 steps slightly to the right of the front of the green with a back pin and from there he knew he was going to have to really struggle to make par! He hit a great little lob shot but still had to recover from the left back bunker to make is par.

I'm not sure exactly what you're attempting to get at David with your constant discussions of strategy but there is no question Riviera's #10 is highly strategic, it's a great hole and with firm green conditions on that course the scoring spectrum will be wide on #10, particularly for a hole that's driveable by tour pros. It'd be unusual for tour pros to make doubles or worse on that hole but with firm greens if they missed that tee shot in the wrong place (not hard with the way the green and green-end is designed) they will make an unusual amount of bogies on a hole that short.

[DMoriarty]

I'm not sure exactly what you're attempting to get at David with your constant discussions of strategy but there is no question Riviera's #10 is highly strategic, it's a great hole and with firm green conditions on that course the scoring spectrum will be wide on #10, particularly for a hole that's driveable by tour pros. It'd be unusual for tour pros to make doubles or worse on that hole but with firm greens if they missed that tee shot in the wrong place (not hard with the way the green and green-end is designed) they will make an unusual amount of bogies on a hole that short.

I am 'attempting to get at' a better understanding of great golf course architecture, particularly strategic golf course architecture.   I know that you seem to think there is nothing more to talk about, but I beg to differ.  

I have mentioned before that I disagree with your scoring spectrum theory (I think I was a lurker when you first offered it) but have never really articulated my thoughts on the matter.   Given that we both agree that Riviera is a great hole, I thought it might be a good place to start.  The numbers, after all, are not what you expected and not what your theory would predict.  

Again, you can discard the facts by assuming that this year the hole was too wet, and I do agree that the hole most likely plays better with firmer conditions, but I am not convinced that this makes enough of a difference to fit the hole in with your theory.   (For one thing, I am not sure you ever get much roll anywhere at Riviera except on the greens, because of the Kikuya.)  

As others have mentioned above, one way to get a wide scoring spectrum is to have some sort of severe penalty associated with a bad shot.  Above, you put it like this (my bold):

 

I think if you look at most all holes that have been considered "great" over time you'll find they do have a wide scoring spectrum and particularly at the level of the good player.  I think the reason being is they somehow do reward intelligent thought and execution (high shot value) really well but they also penalize something less than intelligent thought and execution quite severely!

To put it simply, I dont think that a golf hole needs to dole out a constant stream of severe penalties in order to be great.  

The problem with your theory, I think, is that it lacks subtlety.  What of the holes that take their toll a little at a time, over a number of rounds?  What of the holes where a good golfer views as a birdie hole, yet he usually only manages pars.  What of the holes where the better player plays agressively, only to lose a shot to much of the field?  

I've got more, but lets stop here for now to see where this takes us.  

Looking forward to your response, and hopefully the responses of others.

[yogi_barry]

Reading this thread - Pinehurst No. 2 comes to mind as a course with holes which don't necessarily have an overwhelming propensity to wide range of scores...  My experience is that great rounds are usually "grinded out" and bad rounds are akin to a "slow burn"...  

The strategy is different - maybe more subtle... Poorly executed play can yield impossible scrambles, but not necessarily a blow up number...  Great play doesn't necessarily blister any holes either...  Subtle stragety, subtle results, great course...?

[A_Clay_Man]

DM-Every hole is a birdie hole in the mind of good golfer. Also, I would agree with this, if you replaced the word hole with course.

To put it simply, I dont think that a golf hole needs to dole out a constant stream of severe penalties in order to be great

I also don't believe a hole with width and only bunkering doles out penal, it's the golfer who places himself in harms way. And when we are talking about relatively short distances, a six seven or eight, from the elite of the elite is preposterous in todays world of high tech and perfect swings.

[DMoriarty]

Reading this thread - Pinehurst No. 2 comes to mind as a course with holes which don't necessarily have an overwhelming propensity to wide range of scores...  My experience is that great rounds are usually "grinded out" and bad rounds are akin to a "slow burn"...  

The strategy is different - maybe more subtle... Poorly executed play can yield impossible scrambles, but not necessarily a blow up number...  Great play doesn't necessarily blister any holes either...  Subtle stragety, subtle results, great course...?

Steve, I havent had the pleasure of playing Pinehurst No. 2, but from your description, it sounds like a course with the kind of holes I describe.  
___________

Adam,  I doubt that every good golfer expects a birdie on every hole.  They may dream of it, but I doubt they expect it.

If I understand you correctly, I think I would agree with you regarding a wide hole with only bunkers, depending of course on the bunkers and the green.  

As to what is preposterous from a good player, you are probably correct, but I dont know if that is truly a modern phenomenon.

[BCrosby]

DMoriarty says:

"The problem with your theory, I think, is that it lacks subtlety.  What of the holes that take their toll a little at a time, over a number of rounds?  What of the holes where a good golfer views as a birdie hole, yet he usually only manages pars.  What of the holes where the better player plays agressively, only to lose a shot to much of the field?"

I think you and TEP are talking at cross purposes. TEP's theory is nothing more than an attempt to get at what it means for a hole to be strategic. (BTW, the are lots of perfectly fine holes that are not strategic. We are just trying to unpack the concept of "strategic" here. We are not making any prescriptive claims about how holes generally ought to be designed.)

A central part of notion of a strategic hole is that the hole effectively tempts the player to take risks (Can we waive the anthropomorphism rule here?). Good strategic holes are ones where the temptation to take risks is real, palpable, and not just academic. They will present choices that the player can't avoid taking seriously.

It follows that such holes will be ones where  people will take more risks than they would on a less strategic hole.  

If that is true about a hole, it will necessarily be a hole where the scoring dispersion will be wider. Certainly wider than on a hole where such temptations are less effective. (Again, because if the temptationis is less effective, fewer people will be tempted. A tautology of course, but then all tautologies are true. )  

The classic example is no. 13 at ANGC. Year in and year out, there are roughly the same number of under par, even par and over par scores there at the Masters. (An almost perfect scoring spread.)  The temptations presented are compelling. The pay off is clear, the penalties are equally clear. And, even better, every time you play the hole you have to confront the same deliciously agonizing choice. Go or no go. Which is why it is a great, strategic hole. (BTW, it is not a great penal hole, if your tastes run in that direction. Crump might not have liked it.)

Your paragraph conflates a lot of things about the difficulty of a hole with how we get to know a hole or something. All valid ways to talk about golf holes, but not terribly useful ways to unpack the very rich notion of "strategic" when used to describe a golf hole.

Think of the utility of the scoring dispersion concept this way: It measures the effectiveness of the temptations presented by a hole. If they don't effectivley tempt, there will be a narrow scoring range. (A US Open long par 4).  If they do effectively tempt, lots of people will take risks. (ANGC no. 13) On such great strategic holes, some players will succeed and be rewarded will low scores, some will fail and pay the price with high scores.

Hence, we ought to find a wide scoring dispersion on these holes.

At least that's the theory.

Bob

P.S. To be consistent, it appears that no. 10 at Riviera may not be as strategic as I had thought. Though I still suspect that 2004 was a scoring aberration. It would be fun to dig back into prior years. Note also that the scoring dispersion on par threes is always less than on par 4's and on par 4's it is always less than on par 5's.

[TEPaul]

Bob:

Excellent post there--really well layed out. That one's printable! On certain holes such as ANGC's #12, 13 and 15, maybe #11 too I'd like to run some historical numbers on the Sunday rounds of the Masters because that generally when the temptation factor is ratched up the highest and the strategic ramifications get the sweatiest!

[DMoriarty]

Bob,

Thank you for the excellent description of your theory.  You certainly gave me something to think about.  After doing so, however, I still must disagree.  

I think you and TEP are talking at cross purposes. TEP's theory is nothing more than an attempt to get at what it means for a hole to be strategic. (BTW, the are lots of perfectly fine holes that are not strategic. We are just trying to unpack the concept of "strategic" here. We are not making any prescriptive claims about how holes generally ought to be designed.)

This is what I thought Tom was trying to do also, but a while back Tom threw me (and apparently you) a curve by expanding the theory to include all good holes (my bold):

That theory is that a wide scoring spectrum is an indicator of the quality of golf holes not just that they're highly strategic although in the context of all this that too might be a very strong implication.
. . .

From the data he compiled it would seem to indicate that to be true--that the widest scoring spectrum occured on holes that were considered the best holes--and probably not incidentally were also considered the most strategic holes--eg #13!

But even if we limit the theory to only strategic holes, I still believe it might be faulty.   [In truth, my  original objection to the theory applied only to strategic holes-- I dont really buy the notion that there are plenty of great holes out there which complety lack strategic features. But that is for another thread . . . ]

A central part of notion of a strategic hole is that the hole effectively tempts the player to take risks (Can we waive the anthropomorphism rule here?). Good strategic holes are ones where the temptation to take risks is real, palpable, and not just academic. They will present choices that the player can't avoid taking seriously.  

I disagree.  

Your theory only identifies strategic holes with obvious and penal obstacles.   Obvious because the golfer is forced to consider them before advancing.  As you said, the risks "present choices that the golfer cant avoid taking serously."  Penal because the obstacle must be significant enough to result in risks which are real, palpable" and "the player can't avoid taking seriously."  You consicely encapsulate the penal and obvious nature of these holes in your in your description of ANGC 13:

"the penalties are clear."

I think it a mistake to assume that great strategic holes need be penal or that their strategic obstacles need be obvious.  So long as a golf hole can regularly tempt golfers to take routes which might not be in their best interest, strategy exists.  

If the potential risk is only the loss of a fraction of a stroke, why is this such a bad thing?  Couldnt this be a good thing in the long run?  A member takes a certain line and gets a couple of birdies, and he is a sucker to that line for a long, long time, isnt he?  . . .even if he only makes pars and an occasional bogey there-after?  

Every time we make a choice on the golf course, we are taking certain risks in the hopes of gaining certain advantages.  To say that all great strategic holes contain blatant, penal risks is much too heavy handed and neglects all subtlety in golf architecture.  After all, isnt it sometimes the faint and obscure features which make a golf hole strategically interesting?  

It follows that such holes will be ones where people will take more risks than they would on a less strategic hole.

Not necessarily.  If the potential penalty is great enough and the probability of success is low enough then the vast majority of golfers will face no choice at all.  For example, if one of the choices is a forced carry of 250 yds, then almost all golfers really have no choice at all.  It is very diffucult to come up with penal, blatant obstacles which challenge multiple levels of golfers.  

The classic example is no. 13 at ANGC. . . . The pay off is clear, the penalties are equally clear. And, even better, every time you play the hole you have to confront the same deliciously agonizing choice. Go or no go. Which is why it is a great, strategic hole. . . .

While I have not been fortunate enough to play the hole, even here I disagree.   To my mind it neither the creek in front nor the  "go or no go" decision which make the hole great.  Without the slope of the landing area, ANGC 13 is really not that much different than a multitude of "go-no-go" holes.

Your paragraph conflates a lot of things about the difficulty of a hole with how we get to know a hole or something. All valid ways to talk about golf holes, but not terribly useful ways to unpack the very rich notion of "strategic" when used to describe a golf hole.

If I so conflated, I was following TEPaul's conflation.  I hope this post deconflates my previous conflatitude.  

One aside though . . . you dont really think that getting to know a course is unrelated to strategy, do you?  

Think of the utility of the scoring dispersion concept this way: It measures the effectiveness of the temptations presented by a hole. If they don't effectivley tempt, there will be a narrow scoring range. (A US Open long par 4).  If they do effectively tempt, lots of people will take risks. (ANGC no. 13) On such great strategic holes, some players will succeed and be rewarded will low scores, some will fail and pay the price with high scores.

 

I disagree again.  Temptations must be viewed in the context of probabilities of success and potential penalty.  

If the penalty is perceived as small enough, a person may be tempted into taking a line with a very low probability of success.  A strategic scenario which is little used by most modern architects, but a charming and compelling one nonetheless.   Yet your theory will ignore it.  


So that is my indictment, so far.  I am making it up as I go.

DM

P.S. As to your conclusion that Riviera 10 might not be so strategic after all . . . .  

What if this year was not an abberation?  Do you really want to discount one of the world's great strategic holes for the sake of one of TEPaul's cockamamie theories, or any gca.com theory?  

[TEPaul]

Wow. Reading that last post, or trying to, is like reading some cyclical legal brief, the point of which is not close to clear to me.

"What if this year was not an abberation?  Do you really want to discount one of the world's great strategic holes for the sake of one of TEPaul's cockamamie theories, or any gca.com theory?"

If this year was not an aberration, I'd like to know that. What if it was an aberration? I've never seen scoring numbers on a hole compared or on this hole compared. Never seen them compared from different years under different conditions. I've never seen scoring numbers on various holes throughout a course compared on Sunday or any other day. I'd like to do that to see what they may show. Just producing the scoring numbers on #10 this year may show something although I have no idea what that is. Do you? And who said anyone wanted to discount the fact that Riviera's #10 is a great strategic hole? I think that's been pretty well proven over the decades. There must be some good reason so many players including tour pros say that about this hole so I'd like to find out how that translates into scoring numbers. Maybe it's as simple as something like TOC's #18. Maybe they just really expect to make birdie on both those little holes and if they don't or make worse than par it really plays with their heads. But numbers will probably have to be compared to see if there appears to be any meaning in them. Just throwing out the numbers on one hole in one year isn't comparative to anything that I can see. The wide scoring dispersion theory is just a theory. There's little doubt that Riviera's #10 has been considered a great little strategic hole for years. Nobody's trying to discount that fact!

[BCrosby]

DMoriarty says:

"If the potential penalty is great enough and the probability of success is low enough then the vast majority of golfers will face no choice at all.  For example, if one of the choices is a forced carry of 250 yds, then almost all golfers really have no choice at all.  It is very diffucult to come up with penal, blatant obstacles which challenge multiple levels of golfers."

You make my point. If the risks are too difficult to tempt you, then it is not a very good strategic hole. In fact, it may be a bad hole. It may even be a penal hole. And such a hole will have a very narrow scoring dispersion. Necessarily.

DMoriarty says:

"Your theory only identifies strategic holes with obvious and penal obstacles.  Obvious because the golfer is forced to consider them before advancing.  As you said, the risks "present choices that the golfer cant avoid taking serously."  Penal because the obstacle must be significant enough to result in risks which are real, palpable" and "the player can't avoid taking seriously."  You consicely encapsulate the penal and obvious nature of these holes in your in your description of ANGC 13"

You misunderstand me. There is nothing about a well constructed strategic hole that should require you to take any risks. To the contrary, it should provide options to avoid them altogether if the player so choses.

(BTW, that's a decent working definition of the difference between a penal hole and a startegic hole. A penal hole requires you - you have not choice - ya gotta - deal with hazards to advance towards the green. Not so with a classic strategic hole. A good strategic hole ought to provide ways to the play the hole so as to minimize risks, if you so choose.)

The part I think you are missing is that great strategic holes (and the corresponding wide scoring spectrums on such holes) are those where you WANT to take risks, they lure you into taking risks, hazards aren't merely penalties but points of attraction which, if successfully negotiated, result in big pay-offs on the scorecard.

Perhaps my use of the word "required" was unfortunate. I meant "required" in the sense that hazards on these holes draw you to them, make you want to flirt with them and in that sense "require" or "engage" your attention.

If you are playing 13 ANGC and the delicious go/no go decsion is not central to your experience, if you don't sense the strategic richness of that moment, then one of the main glories of the game just pulled out of the station without you.

Again, you don't have to try to carry the creek with a wood/long iron. It's not "required". You can lay up and flip a little wedge to a fairly large green. I mean "required" in the sense that a golfer with a modicum of imagination is "required" to make endlessly fascinating choices. The hole demands that you make choices. It doesn't dictate choices. That's what great strategic holes are about.

When playing great strategic holes, some will make bad choices, some will make good choices. And the fingerprints of those choices are all over the scorecards players turn in. And when you add up the numbers, there tend to be lots of under par scores, lots of over par scores and lots of pars. In short, a wide range of scores.

As my son says, it's so bling bling. (Or is it blink, blink?)

Bob  

[TEPaul]

I've just always felt holes that golfers generally play the same way day in and day out are sort of one dimensional. Particularly golfers of a comparable playing level such as tour pros. To me that shows there's no particularly interesting choices or optional strategies on those holes.

Other holes that have distinct choices such as Riviera's #10 or ANGC's #13 seem to create some kind of balance or equilbrium between or among those choices even if they are extremely distinct in risks and rewards. Matter of fact, particularly if they're extremely distinct in risks and rewards!

I have no real idea how the scoring numbers on holes with functional multi-options of highly distinct risks and rewards play out but we may find out some day. My sense is that the scoring dispersion would increase in some interesting ways.

But when I see tour pros play a hole really different from one another as is always true on Riviera's #10 and to some degree on ANGC's #13 my sense is those holes possess some really distinct strategies that are somehow in a form of decision making equilibrium which would necessarily appear to result in different decisions and perhaps very different results. And different decisions which carry distinctly different risks and rewards would seem to ultimately create interesting scoring dispersion. What that is on any hole of course remains to be analyzed!

I have no idea if this year's scoring spread on Riviera's #10 is representative of other years but my sense tells me that the one factor that alters tour pros ability to score is firm or soft green surfaces (that's essentially the key factor to me "ideal maintenance meld"--eg firm green surfaces).

It's at least interesting to me that about 40% of this year's Nissan field birdied #10. That would indicate to me that the hole is very much a half-par hole (3 1/2) to those guys. What does that say about how they think about the hole and arrive at decisions about how to play it? It say quite a lot to me.

In a scoring dispersion sense though we have to look at not just birdies against pars (which again is sort of interesting in and of itself) but what happens when the risks don't pay off and what happens when the rewards do and what numbers those things result in.

I have nothing to compare those scoring numbers on #10 this year to but my sense tells me that a hole where something like 75-80% of the tour pros par it---it might not be quite so interesting strategically.

[TEPaul]

Maybe another way of looking at this subject--possibly even as it might apply to some kind of scoring dispersion is to make an assumption first. That could be that the so-called "half-par" hole is where many of these holes that are considered great or strategically great seem to fall. And then attempt to estimate what the scoring dispersion on them may be to see if it's indicative somehow.

Using that concept or assumption is by no means unique or orginal though. But it might be interesting to analyze those types of holes first against their scoring dispersions. And it would probably be more meaningful at first to do that at the tour pro level---as they have a tight band of comparability and we can get the scoring stats on them. Obviously all the ones mentioned below don't have tour pros scoring stats but we could find others in this category that do.

I say "half-pars" are probably the best to analyze because they really do seem to be the holes that are considered the highly strategic and often the great ones. And of course it seems not to matter at all what side of actual par their "half par" perception falls on.

Some well known below actual par "half par" holes;

1. Riviera's #10
2. TOC's #18
3. ANGC's #13
4. CPC's #9
5. Ganton's #14

Some well known above actual par "half par" holes;

1. TOC's Road hole
2. CPC's #16
3. PVGC's #13
4. Merion's #18
5. HVGC's #18

[DMoriarty]

And who said anyone wanted to discount the fact that Riviera's #10 is a great strategic hole? I think that's been pretty well proven over the decades. . . .  There's little doubt that Riviera's #10 has been considered a great little strategic hole for years. Nobody's trying to discount that fact!

Who is trying to discount that Riv. 10 is a great strategic hole?   BCrosby for one.  He said, just above:

"To be consistent, it appears that no. 10 at Riviera may not be as strategic as I had thought."

Perhaps you should redirect your indignation at him.

Just producing the scoring numbers on #10 this year may show something although I have no idea what that is. Do you?

Yes, I do.  It means that over 4 PGA Tour rounds, this year, the scoring spectrum, as you two define it, was quite narrow.  

By the way, over how many years did you guys extrapolate for Augusta?  (Not a rhetorical question, I really cant remember.)

Tom, I know that you are often annoyed and confused by long detailed posts, so let me boil it down for you.  Quoting from above:

Temptations must be viewed in the context of probabilities of success and potential penalty. . . . If the penalty is perceived as small enough, a person may be tempted into taking a line with a very low probability of success.  A strategic scenario which is little used by most modern architects, but a charming and compelling one nonetheless.  Yet your theory will ignore it.  

Isnt it true that your theory cannot account for a subtle strategic hole with a very low risk, yet a very low probability of the desired outcome?  

______________________

Bob, Unfortunately I dont have time to respond to your post now, but look forward to addressing it later.  In the meantime, I pose the same question to you, immediately above.  

[BCrosby]

DMoriarty -

The answer is no, it is not true.

Bob

[TEPaul]

David:

I'm not sure why you assume I'm annoyed or confused by any of this, although I must admit it's hard for me sometimes to figure out what you're driving at.

But it seems it might be this;

"Isnt it true that your theory cannot account for a subtle strategic hole with a very low risk, yet a very low probability of the desired outcome?"

I suppose you'd have to give me some idea what that desired outcome might be before I can even contemplate a question like that. Perhaps some hole somewhere about which you could explain what you mean by low risk and what that low probability outcome might be--maybe a score of some sort with the description of the hole would help.

But this:  

"Temptations must be viewed in the context of probabilities of success and potential penalty. . . . If the penalty is perceived as small enough, a person may be tempted into taking a line with a very low probability of success.  A strategic scenario which is little used by most modern architects, but a charming and compelling one nonetheless.  Yet your theory will ignore it."

What is that? Is that a quote from you? I know what context or contexts various temptations might be viewed in by various players regarding probabilities of success and potentials for failure. I've certainly played enough golf and tournament golf and long enough to understand that. If I didn't I'd have to be fairly unobservant after all these years.

But I don't know that either Bob or I have ignored anything with our theory. We're just trying to apply the theory and run some numbers on various types of holes to see what the wide scoring spectrum theory shows--if anything. Why don't you give us a well known hole of the type you're saying we're trying to ignore and we'll run some numbers on it and see how the theory plays out vs what the general strategic perception of the hole is.

You seem to think we're trying to force this theory on golf and golf architecture and redefine the general perception of various holes as to their strategic import. Or perhaps you feel you've found some new meaning or definition in what strategic means or should mean in golf. I'm not sure exactly what you're driving at but nevertheless this is a theory and as far as I can see we're just trying to test it.  

I'll await from you what 'a subtle strategic hole with a very low risk, yet a very low probability of the desired outcome' is all about.

Would it perhaps be something like Rustic Canyon's #12 where the concept we were discussing before it was built was to provide very little risk on the tee shot but where the completely non-penal tee shot could have real meaning in relation to things to come, all of which might be adjustable from one day to the next? That sort of concept someone like Max Behr called "indirect taxation" strategy! In the case of Rustic's #12 the extremely non-penal tee shot was supposed to provide very indirect taxation but eventually real taxation nonetheless!

[DMoriarty]

You make my point. If the risks are too difficult to tempt you, then it is not a very good strategic hole. In fact, it may be a bad hole. It may even be a penal hole. And such a hole will have a very narrow scoring dispersion. Necessarily.  

Perhaps you have missed my point.  You've tested your theory using a sample of players with a razor thin spectrum of abilities.  But a great strategic hole must be great for more than just the world's best.  Expand your sample range of abilities, and the vast majority of golfers may not be tempted at all.  

Take ANGC 13.  All but the best golfers have absolutely no realistic chance of an eagle putt.  To apply your test, the risks are to difficult to tempt them.  Yet I am sure you dont want to necessarily conclude that ANGC 13 is a weak strategic hole.      

You misunderstand me. There is nothing about a well constructed strategic hole that should require you to take any risks. To the contrary, it should provide options to avoid them altogether if the player so choses.

I am fairly certain that I understand you.  I didnt say the golfer had to take risks, only that he had to consider them.  

The part I think you are missing is that great strategic holes (and the corresponding wide scoring spectrums on such holes) are those where you WANT to take risks, they lure you into taking risks, hazards aren't merely penalties but points of attraction which, if successfully negotiated, result in big pay-offs on the scorecard.

And I think the part you are missing is that it is the reward which tempts.  Hazards arent points of attraction.  The chance at pay-off is.  You dont need a big risk to have a chance at a big payoff on the scorecard.  

Perhaps my use of the word "required" was unfortunate. I meant "required" in the sense that hazards on these holes draw you to them, make you want to flirt with them and in that sense "require" or "engage" your attention.

I want to flirt with them only because I want the advantage which comes from successfully flirting with them.  If it is the hazards which attract you, you are a golf masochist.

If you are playing 13 ANGC and the delicious go/no go decsion is not central to your experience, if you don't sense the strategic richness of that moment, then one of the main glories of the game just pulled out of the station without you.

 

But if I dont hit the ball far enough, all the imagination in the world istn going to get me there it two.  As for other choices the hole might present, many of those are more subtle, like ground slope, and wont likely produce the kind of divergent scores out of the pros you are looking for.  

When playing great strategic holes, some will make bad choices, some will make good choices. And the fingerprints of those choices are all over the scorecards players turn in. And when you add up the numbers, there tend to be lots of under par scores, lots of over par scores and lots of pars. In short, a wide range of scores.

While I do appreciate your explanations on the basics of strategic golf holes, I assure you that my disagreement does not stem from a lack of a fundamental understanding of such holes.  Rather, I am asking you and Tom to consider that there may be great strategic holes which dont always leave such obvious clues as a stream of double bogeys and eagles.  

Eliminate the obvious potential penalty all together, and you can still have a good strategic hole.  

__________________________
Tom,

How about TOC 18?  Or Riviera 10 as it existed pre-greenside bunkers?  Or Riviera 10 as it existed last week?

RC 12 would work also.  

My point is, indirect taxation wont produce a wide scoring spectrum.

[TEPaul]

DavidM:

I read your post #47 very carefully and I have to conclude that your reasoning, given your responses to the quotes you put up from Bob Crosby are completely shot through with illogic and basic misunderstanding regarding various strategies utilized by differing levels of players.

Firstly, there's nothing faulty about the way Bob's going about testing the quality of golf holes at ANGC by utilizing statistical results from the tour pro set! He's simply testing holes in their probable strategic import or quality import on a single skill level because doing it that way is easier to do given their known results on those holes on that course. I can't imagine how he could do that at ANGC with every skill level that plays there annually without calculating the scorecards of everyone who played there. Obviously those scorecards don't exist.

Furthermore, you seem to be failing to see the obvious! Clearly neither you nor I can take advantage of the same strategies on various holes in the same number of shots and in the same manner as a tour player can. Your remark about you not being able to go for #13 ANGC in two shots then becomes virtually meaningless and a point you should not be making with Bob Crosby! So there's no reason you should be disagreeing with what he's attempting to prove with that example.

In all likelihood there're probably numerous other little strategies and interesting, even distinct and stark risk/reward situations all around #13 ANGC for the less skilled level of player. Bob Crosby is not saying there aren't. You attempting to cross over Rae's Creek (or not) in some way at ANGC's #13 may be every bit as interesting strategically to you as it is to Tiger Woods but obviously you'd likely be doing it on your third shot instead of your second (unless you were playing from the appropriate tee for you which could make playing the hole to you vaguely comparable to Tiger from the tips).

And you're taking issue with Bob over what he called the "attraction" of the hazard feature is also basically meaningless.

I'll try and show next what he means by that by offering what I consider to be the best example and analogy of that sort of thing from Max Behr.

Later...

 

[BCrosby]

David -

First, the strategic nature of a hole is normally measured in respect of a scratch golfer. There's no rule that says it has be that way. But that is the usual convention and that is how I and most people talk about strategy. It is of course true that the strategic features of 13 at ANGC will not be the same for Tiger and a 20 handicapper.

Second, the notion of strategic play always entails (in a strong sense) that you are seeking the lowest possible score. People don't firt with hazrds just to flirt with hazards. Strategic play is meaningless if you aren't trying to reap the rewards of a good score. And if you don't believe me on this point, ask Pat Mucci.

Bob

[Tags:]

Tags: