The Rules of Golf as civil code

[Mark Bourgeois]

They're a civil code not "common law," yes?

Why did the rules develop as a code rather than as a set of principles -- or at least as a set of rules but with latitude for interpretation? Do any sports base their rules on a principles-based philosophy or to put it another way: which sports allow their referees the greatest latitude for interpretation?

Golf is inherently more complicated than (almost all) other sports given it is played across a very nonstandard playing field, yes? I can see complexity playing a role -- I give you the ever-expanding "Decisions on the Rules of Golf"  -- but how complex would a sport have to be to tip the philosophy to common law. And why didn't / doesn't that complexity tip the RoG?

[steps quickly back to avoid the rush of this topic sinking to the 20th page in 5 minutes]

[Ken Moum]

I think you have it backward. No sport I know of gives referees the latitude golf does. Name one other sport where intent makes a difference in a refree's final ruling.

The size of the decisions manual is just a product of our (Americans) obsession with stroke play and "fairness."

K

[Jim_Kennedy]

The first code was amended 14 years after it was created, and by 1892 (R&A, prior to any American code) the rules  had grown from 13 to 40, with an additional 14 special rules for medal play and 10 more for etiquette. The first clubs created their own codes which were really no more than a couple of handfuls of rules describing their interpretation of the principles of the game, and when you think about it, that 'method' could still be used today by any club who wished to go down that road, although golf would never have expanded if rule making remained in the hands of various fiefdoms, it needed a cohesive set of Rules that encompassed the many different situations that would arise once the game left the seaside.

The early rule makers knew what Richard Tufts wrote a couple of hundred years after the first code was written:
"These basic principles (of golf) fortunately are simple, logical, practical and expressive. By their recognition and by their application to specific Rules, it is possible to bring warmth and an understanding to the austerity and complexity of the Rules.
    The one serious warning that must be made is that these principles can never become an adequate substitute for the Rules themselves. The more exact descriptive wording of the Rules is essential to provide adequate answers to the many complicated questions that arise in the play of the game."

So, if Tufts is correct we are still playing the game by a centuries old set of principles, and we use those principles to create rules as they are needed, the same as was done from the very start.

 

[BCrosby]

"Name one other sport where intent makes a difference in a referee's final ruling."

There are intentional fouls in basketball and football. Ejecting a pitcher for throwing at a batter is a decision based on the perceived intent of the pitcher. Ditto in soccer.

As to Mark's excellent question, I think early on rules did evolve much like common law did. You begin with core notions like you play the ball as you find it and you play only your ball. How those core rules play out in different situations can get very complicated, hence the rise of early St Andrews rules which were, probably (no one knows for sure) the codification of widely understood "common law" interpretations of how different situations should be handled.

There were no uniform rules in the UK until 1900. One of the reasons for unification was that so many 'Southern' clubs (read English clubs) were writing their own rules at the end of the 19th century. So things had gotten very messy.

Hence the sense that the rules were always codified probably goes to the first uniform code book. But that book was the by-product of more than a century of local clubs making local rulings, with St Andrews' local rules serving as a model.

Bob  
      

[Mark Bourgeois]

Feel free to answer any / all / none:

Re Fred Ridley's invocation of Rule 33-7 at the Masters:
1) if he used the particular clause (4.5 or something like that) in a way that was inconsistent with the rule's intent, did he veer into common law territory?
2) even if you think his ruling was consistent, play along--if it wasn't consistent would that be an example of common law application?
3) where do you draw the line for latitude in interpretation? Put another way: you have to "interpret," but where is the line beyond which lies "translation"?
4) re #3, is the opportunity for latitude just a 33-7 Thing? Which other rules allow for translation?

The John Morrissett et al proposals for rules simplification: where do those fit? Do such efforts' legitimacy stem from the civil code philosophy of the rules? Why / why not?

[Niall C]

Mark

Is their not room for interpretation in both the rules of golf and Common Law, and in both instances does "case law" not quickly follow into statute ?

Niall

[BCrosby]

Mark -

I don't think the relevant distinction between legal systems is whether a particular law is subject to interpretation. That's what lawyers and courts do in both systems.

The relevant distinction is the source of the law. Common law is usually thought to be a law created by precedent set by court decisions over time. A civil code is usually thought to be a body of law created by a legislative body (or an entity appointed by a legislative body). Those are very rough generalizations and many laws are a blend of both.  For example, in the US, a  legal system based mostly on English common law, also has a Uniform Commercial Code that was adopted by each state legislature to deal with commercial matters, but much of it is based on older commercial common law.

Where I am going with this is that whether of not Ridley 'interpreted' a golf rule has little to say about the nature of the rule itself. Interpretation of the law is the name of the legal game. French courts interpret their civil codes under varying fact scenarios as frequently as English courts do under their common law system.

The questions that Ridley's actions raise is whether or not his interpretation was a good one given the facts, its implications for other parts of the code and the precedents he might set. All hard questions.

Bob