Sean,
We'll just have to agree to disagree on whether or not Fort Sumter was part of the sovereign state of South Carolina and when in the timeline of events it did or did not become or was the property of the government of the United States, rather than the property of the state of South Carolina. Forgetting, of course, that the US government had by March vacated all but two forts in the entire Confederacy. You are more than welcome to believe that Lincoln was correct in his position regarding the perpetual nature of the Republic, many do. As in many cases that lead to military action the victors position is often considered to be vindicated and justified. Kind of like making the freethrows in pick up game of hoops when you think about it.
There is always another side to every story. As for good faith, the envoys of South Carolina spent five months in Washington before cutting off supplies and mail to Sumter. And only took action after the release of Fox's pending force and supplies. The New York Evening Post of April 10 stated in quoting Lincoln, and I quote,"When the ship arrives, the rebels will "elect between peace and war." Had just a provision ship been sent it could be argued that the Conferacy was acting in bad faith, but three warships were sent as well. It is interesting that Fox's trip is always called a reprovision in northern history tets, when it included a larger military force for occupation under not just the Powhatan but the warships Pawnee and Pocahantas as well. The Baltic could have done the reprovision with no sign of threat. Negotiations ceased only after Lincoln's Innauguration. It was a profound comedy of errors between the Lincoln and Buchanan administrations.
I agree that Davis was agressive in his pursuit of reclaiming the lands of th south. Negotiations broke down only after Lincoln voided the rights of the state that had existed until that time against the counsel of Seward who favored giving Smter back to South Carolina.
Equal time:
Lincoln Man of Peace
Almost all historians reject the claim that Lincoln deliberately provoked the Civil War. They consider the idea unsubstantiated by evidence, inconsistent with Lincoln's character, and unwarranted by the context of events. David M. Potter, for example, contends that Lincoln sincerely pursued a policy that would avert war. Placing great-- too great-- faith in the existence of unionist sentiment in the South, Lincoln did all he could to avoid a confrontation that would und ermine unionist chances of regaining power. He modified his Inaugural Address to eliminate the threat of repossessing federal property, and seriously contemplated abandoning Sumter if military considerations made such an action necessary. Although he would not sacrifice the essential principle of Union, on every occasion, Lincoln adopted the least provocative course available.
In the end, Lincoln reluctantly sent the Sumter expedition only after learning that the reinforcement of Fort Pickens had not taken place. Since Pickens could not provide a symbol of the Union's permanency, the abandonment of Sumter was now unacceptable. Even in these circumstances, Lincoln took the most peaceable course possible. He adopted a plan to resupply rather than reinforce the fort, and informed South Carolina officials of his intention. Althou gh fighting broke out as a result of his decision, Lincoln did not deliberately choose war. Instead, he opted for a course whose consequences were unknown, and which offered at least a possibility of avoiding war.
From Potter's perspective, the bombardment of Sumter represented a failure of Lincoln's policy to avert war. War was an unintended consequence of a policy that failed because of Confederate actions and Lincoln's miscalculation of the strength and determination of the secessionist cause. The Lincoln scholar, James G. Randall, has articulated the significant distinction between intentions and unintended consequences. "To say that Lincoln meant that the first shot would be fired by the other side if a first shot was fired, is not to say that he maneuvered to have the shot fired. The distinction is fundamental," Randall observes.
Lincoln Provoked the War
Southern leaders of the Civil War period placed the blame for the outbreak of fighting squarely on Lincoln. They accused the President of acting aggressively towards the South and of deliberately provoking war in order to overthrow the Confederacy. For its part, the Confederacy sought a peaceable accommodation of its legitimate claims to independence, and resorted to measures of self-defence only when threatened by Lincoln's coercive policy. Thus, Confederate vice president, Alexander H. Stephens, claimed that the war was "inaugurated by Mr. Lincoln." Stephens readily acknowledged that General Beauregard's troops fired the "first gun." But, he argued, the larger truth is that "in personal or national conflicts, it is not he who strikes the first blow, or fires the first gun that inaugurates or begins the conflict." Rather, the true aggressor is "the first who renders force necessary."
Stephens identified the beginning of the war as Lincoln's order sending a "hostile fleet, styled the 'Relief Squadron'," to reinforce Fort Sumter. "The war was then and there inaugurated and begun by the authorities at Washington. General Beauregard did not open fire upon Fort Sumter until this fleet was, to his knowledge, very near the harbor of Charleston, and until he had inquired of Major Anderson . . . whether he would engage to take no part in the expected blow, then coming down upon him from the approaching fleet . . . When Major Anderson . . .would make no such promise, it became necessary for General Beauregard to strike the first blow, as he did; otherwise the forces under his command might have been exposed to two fires at the same time-- one in front, and the other in the rear." The use of force by the Confederacy , therefore, was in "self-defence," rendered necessary by the actions of the other side.
Jefferson Davis, who, like Stephens, wrote his account after the Civil War, took a similar position. Fort Sumter was rightfully South Carolina's property after secession, and the Confederate government had shown great "forbearance" in trying to reach an equitable settlement with the federal government. But the Lincoln administration destroyed these efforts by sending "a hostile fleet" to Sumter. "The attempt to represent us as the aggressors," Davis argued, "is as unfounded as the complaint made by the wolf against the lamb in the familiar fable. He who makes the assault is not necessarily he that strikes the first blow or fires the first gun."
From Davis's point of view, to permit the strengthening of Sumter, even if done in a peaceable manner, was unacceptable. It meant the continued presence of a hostile threat to Charleston. Further, although the ostensible purpose of the expedition was to resupply, not reinforce the fort, the Confederacy had no guarantee that Lincoln would abide by his word. And even if he restricted his actions to resupply in this case, what was to prevent him from attempting to reinforce the fort in the future? Thus, the attack on Sumter was a measure of "defense." To have acquiesced in the fort's relief, even at the risk of firing the first shot, "would have been as unwise as it would be to hesitate to strike down the arm of the assailant, who levels a deadly weapon at one's breast, until he has actually fired."
In the twentieth century, this critical view of Lincoln's actions gained a wide audience through the writings of Charles W. Ramsdell and others. According to Ramsdell, the situation at Sumter presented Lincoln with a series of dilemmas. If he took action to maintain the fort, he would lose the border South and a large segment of northern opinion which wanted to conciliate the South. If he abandoned the fort, he jeopardized the Union by legitimizing the Confederacy. Lincoln also hazarded losing the support of a substantial portion of his own Republican Party, and risked appearing a weak and ineffective leader.
Lincoln could escape these predicaments, however, if he could induce southerners to attack Sumter, "to assume the aggressive and thus put themselves in the wrong in the eyes of the North and of the world." By sending a relief expedition, ostensibly to provide bread to a hungry garrison, Lincoln turned the tables on the Confederates, forcing them to choose whether to permit the fort to be strengthened, or to act as the aggressor. By this "astute strategy," Lincoln maneuvered the South into firing the first shot.
Two sides, one story, and a lot of ignored history.
A good sight to check out if you're really interested in the other side
http://www.tulane.edu/~sumter/index.htmlAll the best,
JT